Mohamed ElBaradei

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005 is to be shared, in two equal parts, between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way.At a time when the threat of nuclear arms is again increasing, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to underline that this threat must be met through the broadest possible international cooperation. This principle finds its clearest expression today in the work of the IAEA and its Director General. In the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is the IAEA which controls that nuclear energy is not misused for military purposes, and the Director General has stood out as an unafraid advocate of new measures to strengthen that regime. At a time when disarmament efforts appear deadlocked, when there is a danger that nuclear

arms will spread both to states and to terrorist groups, and when nuclear power again appears to be playing an increasingly significant role, IAEA's work is of incalculable importance.

In his will, Alfred Nobel wrote that the Peace Prize should, among other criteria, be awarded to whoever had done most for the "abolition or reduction of standing armies". In its application of this criterion in recent decades, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has concentrated on the struggle to diminish the significance of nuclear arms in international politics, with a view to their abolition. That the world has achieved little in this respect makes active opposition to nuclear arms all the more important today.

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Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei : Director General:

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an intergovernmental organization within the United Nations system. He was appointed to the office effective 1 December 1997, and reappointed to a second term in September 2001.
Dr. ElBaradei was from 1984 a senior member of the IAEA Secretariat, holding a number of high-level policy positions, including that of the Agency´s Legal Adviser and, beginning in 1993, Assistant Director General for External Relations.
Dr. ElBaradei was born in Cairo, Egypt, on 17 June 1942, son of the late Mostafa ElBaradei, a lawyer and former President of the Egyptian Bar Association. He gained a Bachelor’s degree in Law in 1962 at the University of Cairo, and a Doctorate in International Law at the New York University School of Law in 1974. He is also the recipient of various honorary degrees.
He began his career in the Egyptian Diplomatic Service in 1964, serving on two occasions in the Permanent Missions of Egypt to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, in charge of political, legal and arms control issues. From 1974 to 1978 he was a special assistant to the Foreign Minister of Egypt. In 1980 he left the Diplomatic Service and became a senior fellow in charge of the International Law Program at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. From 1981 to 1987 he was also an Adjunct Professor of International Law at the New York University School of Law.
During his career as diplomat, international civil servant and scholar, Dr. ElBaradei has become closely familiar with the work and processes of international organizations, particularly in the fields of international peace and security and international law making. He has lectured widely in the fields of international law, international organizations, arms control and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and is the author of various articles and books on these subjects. He belongs to a number of professional associations, including the International Law Association and the American Society of International Law.
Dr. ElBaradei is married to Aida Elkachef, a teacher at the Vienna International School. They have a daughter, Laila, a lawyer, and a son, Mostafa, a sound engineer, both of whom live and work in London, England.
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CAIRO, Oct. 7 (Xinhuanet) -- Egypt has been honored when International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, an Egyptian, won the Nobel Prize for Peace, the official MENA news agency reported Friday.
   A presidential statement hailed ElBaradei as "a son of Egypt and one of its most outstanding experts in disarmament issues."
   The Nobel committee decision was a further proof of the sound performance of the international nuclear watchdog in countering nuclear proliferation, according to the statement.
   The prize brought to four the number of Egyptians who won this world prestigious prize, after late President Anwar Sadat, writer Naguib Mahfouz and physicist Ahmed Zeweil.

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei (born 1942) is the Director General of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a position he has held since December 1, 1997.

ElBaradei was born in Egypt in 1942. He earned a Bachelor s degree in Law from the University of Cairo in 1962 and a Doctorate in International Law at the New York University School of Law in 1974.

His diplomatic career began in 1964 in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign affairs, where he served on two occasions in the Permanent Missions of Egypt to the United Nations in New York and Geneva. In 1980 he became a senior fellow in charge of the International Law Program at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

Since 1984, ElBaradei has been a senior member of the IAEA Secretariat, holding a number of high-level positions. Before his current position of Director General, he has been the agency's legal adviser (1984 - 1993) and Assistant Director General for External Relations (1993 - 1997).

During the 2003 Iraq disarmament crisis, ElBaradei, along with Hans Blix, led a team of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq, seeking evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

ElBaradei is also a member of the International Law Association and the American Society of International Law. He is married to Aida Elkachef and has two children, Laila and Mostafa.

Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

Nuclear proliferation is on the rise. Equipment, material and training were once largely inaccessible. Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability - and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programs. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons.

Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the Non-Proliferation regime.

The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear non-proliferation. The current system relies on a gentlemen's agreement that is not only non-binding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise.

We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all States to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so — in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the Agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of non-proliferation treaty obligations requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 percent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. Again, as President Bush suggested yesterday, it should be in force for all countries.

In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months’ notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council.

The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users.

Toward this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

Of course, a fundamental part of the non-proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear States recognized under the non-proliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the non-proliferation treaty review conference next year.

We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.